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Poverty in the High-Income Countries: a Marxist Alternative to Mainstream
Ideologies
Abstract
Poverty has been present in all the advanced capitalist countries since the dawn of industrial capitalism
in the late 18C, and remains so to this day. Mainstream explanations of this phenomenon are superficial
and mistake symptoms for causes. In this article we present a Marxist explanation of poverty in the highincome countries since the late 19C. We show how poverty is systematically produced by the dynamics of
capital accumulation and the capital-labour relation, including their spatial dynamics, operating in the
realms of production, social reproduction, and their mediations by the state. Since poverty is produced by
the totality of society, measures which target particular sites or aspects of poverty are doomed to failure:
it cannot be solved outside of an end to capitalism. Since poverty is a condensation of oppressions which
are experienced by the whole population, it can only be addressed by struggles against all forms of
economic exploitation and social oppression, including those mediated by the state. These struggles
benefit the whole population, not just the poor. The collective organisations of the whole working class in
both the production and reproduction spheres are thus crucial for addressing both the immediate needs
and long term interests of the poor.
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1. Introduction
Poverty has been present in all the advanced capitalist countries since the dawn
of industrial capitalism in the late 18C, and remains so to this day. A large
proportion of the working class, sometimes the majority, have long hours of
grinding work both paid and unpaid, unhealthy living and working conditions,
slum housing, food of low quality and quantity, inadequate or non-existent
health care. In consequence, they have short life expectancy relative to the
upper and middle classes (‘absolute poverty’). Moreover, part of the working
class has incomes well below the national median (‘relative poverty’), and are
consequently excluded from normal living conditions and cultural norms. The
persistence of poverty in the rich countries requires explanation. In this article
we present a Marxist explanation, which understands poverty not as an anomaly
but as an inherent feature of the most advanced capitalism.
To understand the persistence of poverty in high-income countries (HICs)1, the
mainstream academic and policy literature does not get us very far. There are
innumerable studies of poverty in particular countries at particular times. These
explanations tend to focus on national peculiarities (economic or political) and
particular periods of the country’s history. In contrast, a thorough explanation
of poverty in a given country and period needs to start from the more abstract
processes which underlie the creation of poverty. The specific forms and causes
of poverty in a particular country and period are, to be sure, important in
developing struggles against it; but these need to be understood as dialectical
developments – more concrete forms – of the historically- and spatially-abstract
causes. This epistemological point leads to a political one: struggles against
poverty need to see themselves as transnational and as anti-capitalist, rather than
simply addressing some ‘problems’ particular to a specific country and time.
Since the work of Booth and Rowntree in the late 19C, there have been
innumerable empirical investigations into the extent and forms of poverty in
particular countries. Some have described correlations of income poverty with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. We avoid the common term ‘More Developed Countries’ because of its uncritical implication
that capitalist ‘development’ is a unilinear, equitable and wholly-beneficial process. We do not
use the term ‘imperialist countries’ in this article, despite believing that imperialism is a real and
important set of processes, because of lack of space to distinguish between the many different
Marxist theories of imperialism.

poor housing, diet, health, family life, crime and so on. Many studies have
described the spatial distribution of poverty between regions, within regions,
and between neighbourhoods within cities (for example Dorling, 2015). Other
research describes the overall distribution of income within a country,
sometimes comparing countries. A large literature discusses definitions of
poverty (Townsend, 1970). But these studies remain descriptive, abstaining
from explanation.
There is a large literature on poverty framed as an issue of ‘social policy’,
focused on certain impacts of the state on poverty (for example Alcock, 1997).
This literature typically has detailed accounts of state transfer payments and
targeted ‘anti-poverty’ policies in a particular country. But this literature is far
too narrowly focused to constitute a theory of poverty: its consideration of
economy and social life in the creation of poverty is sketchy at best.
There have also been theorisations of poverty in the HICs. These are highly
political. Four political strands may be distinguished. First, (neo-) liberal
authors have argued that poverty is a result of ‘political’ blockages in labour
markets – trade unions, national industrial bargaining, minimum wages,
excessive state transfers to the unemployed. If these were removed, labour
markets would clear, and employment and wages would rise (Mankiw, 2001).
But this neo-classical economics has been shown to be thoroughly unscientific
(Green and Nore, 1977). Second, organic conservatives argue that poverty is
due to the culture of the poor: lack of stable nuclear heterosexual families
disrupts domestic reproduction, participation in wage labour and the
socialisation and education of children; ‘welfare dependency’ saps initiative and
self-esteem; pervasive crime provides an alternative to waged employment
while disrupting social reproduction (Lewis, 1979; Murray, 1984). In some
versions, the poor are inherently biologically and psychologically inferior. The
organic conservative view often pictures the poor as a ‘residuum’ or
‘underclass’, a group qualitatively distinct from the rest of the population. By
locating the causes of poverty within poor neighbourhoods, this view entirely
misses (and politically obscures) the role of the capitalist labour market. Third,
social democratic thought during the post-war boom argued that poverty was
the result, variously, of insufficient regulation of the labour market and housing
markets, insufficient counter-cyclical policies, and insufficient funding of public
services and benefits. Thus intensified state action could eliminate poverty in
the rich countries. But this view vastly overestimates both the autonomy and
influence of the state vis a vis capital. Finally, social democratic thought since
the 1980s has shifted towards associationalist and community-development
explanations of poverty, which argue that the poor lack ‘social capital’ and
effective social networks; this lack causes weak community ties for social
reproduction and community organisation, and barriers to upward mobility,
resulting in ‘social exclusion’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001; Cabinet Office,

2002). This repeats the error of organic conservatism of a narrow focus on poor
neighbourhoods.2
There has been surprisingly little Marxist theorisation of poverty in the HICs.
An exception is the work of Tony Novak and Chris Jones (Novak, 1995, 1996;
Jones and Novak, 1999). Novak (1995) argues that poverty cannot be
understood in isolation from the exploitation and oppression of the whole
working class, defined as those dependent on wages of themselves or their
family members as their main income over the life span. The material and
psychological misery of the poor rests on the class relation between labour and
capital, and on the oppressions of gender and racism which are internally related
to class. The emergence of wage labour as the only means of survival for the
majority of the population in the early modern period imposed on workers a
chronic state of insecurity and struggle for survival.
In the late 18C and the first half of the 19C, this condition of the working class
was understood as poverty; the whole working class was poor. In the second
half of the 19C in Britain, the bourgeoisie became interested in poverty, partly
due to fear of rebellion and partly because of concern that an adequate labour
force was not being reproduced for certain industries and occupations and for
the army. Bourgeois ideology started to picture ‘the poor’ as a problem group
distinct from the rest of the working class. This group was surveyed, its
conditions of life measured, a ‘poverty line’ drawn to demarcate it, and policies
formulated to either improve or repress. In this process, the roots of poverty in
wage labour as such were forgotten. Novak argued that it is precisely this
connection that needs to be re-established. The poor are those who experience
the sharpest forms of the disempowerment experienced by the whole working
class.
This crucial insight is the starting point for this article. In this article we develop
Novak’s insight by exploring in detail how poverty is produced by structures
which span the whole society – economy, social life, the state – and which
involve the whole working class. We show that differentiation in the material
circumstances of workers, far from being an ‘imperfection’, is produced
systematically within each of these spheres.
In the dialectical Marxist approach which we use, capitalist society is a totality,
within which the parts are internally related (Ollman 1993; Gough and Das,
2017). Thus poverty, a particular aspect of society, needs to be understood as
part of the totality, as Novak pointed out. Moreover, economy, social life and
‘politics’/the state are internally related moments in the construction of poverty:
they do not merely interact with but rather constitute
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. For critiques of these four approaches, see Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006: Part III.

each other. In contrast, the mainstream explanations of poverty just considered
concentrate their attention on just one realm of economy, social life or politics,
with the other two considered, at most, as ‘context’. In this article, we will
present the determinants of poverty in the waged economy, the state and social
life in turn, while showing how each of these is mediated by the others.
Contemporary poverty in the HICs is often attributed to neoliberalism. Since
the 1970s the neoliberal strategy of capital and the state has indeed widened and
deepened poverty. Wages have been reduced, labour has been intensified,
employment contracts have been made more flexible for capital, and
unemployment has increased. Taxation has been switched from capital to
labour, public services have deteriorated, and state benefits have been reduced
and made more restrictive. Housing has become increasingly subject to
capitalist logics. Social life has become increasingly individualised and
dominated by commodity consumption, and networks of support for the poor
have been eroded (Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006: Part II). But this should not
hide that poverty is produced by capitalism even in ‘normal’ times. The essence
of neoliberalism is to strengthen the rule of capital over labour; this necessarily
deepens capital’s production of poverty – exactly the opposite of the claim of
neoliberal ideologues.
We focus on the HICs, within which the great majority of the population are
directly or indirectly dependent on wage labour, where an independent
peasantry, urban petty-trading and artisanal production are only a small part of
the economy, where there are substantial public or socially-insured services, and
where there are some state transfer payments to those on low incomes. The
analysis here concerns roughly the last 120 years, the period within which the
state has played a major role in both economy and public services. To our
knowledge, this is the first account of the creation of poverty in the HICs at this
level of historical and spatial abstraction.
2. Poverty and the waged economy
Two central proximate causes of poverty and economic insecurity are
unemployment and what we will call ‘poor jobs’. The latter are jobs which pay
low wages per hour, per week, or per year, have disciplinary management of the
labour process, have high intensity of work, and are insecure; they may also be
part time, have hours varied daily by the employer, or anti-social shifts; they
often lack benefits such as pensions, sick pay or parental leave. Poor jobs not
only give poor incomes but also disempower and devalue workers within the
production process, with negative impacts on their autonomy, personal
development and self-esteem. Moreover, the capital-labour relation causes
competition between workers for jobs, particularly at the lower end of the labour
market, and thus social and political atomisation. Both poor jobs and
unemployment are created by the fundamental dynamics of capitalism.

Employment
For a capitalist economy to function continuously, wages cannot for long
periods rise above a level which leaves business with an inadequate rate of profit
on capital invested. If the rate of profit is too low, investment will fall because
of lack of funds and lack of incentive to invest. There is therefore a permanent
downward pressure on wages and a disciplinary pressure on workers: if workers
do not work sufficiently hard and/or do not accept low enough wages to make
their employer’s business profitable, they risk losing their jobs. This pressure
acts on workers in each industry and firm. It also acts on the unemployed,
requiring them to accept jobs at a wage level that will ensure their prospective
employer’s profitability. This endemic competition means that other employees
are competitors for jobs and promotion, and employees of other firms are rivals.
Industries where the workers have ‘privileged’ conditions are put under pressure
to lower them to the average; and workers in each locality or nation can easily
come to perceive those in other territories as ‘thieves’ of their jobs (Gough,
1992; Gough 2003: Ch.13).
These processes put constant downward pressure on employment conditions.
But wages, employment benefits, security of employment and managerial
control are highly differentiated between industries, types of work and
territories. Thus territorial industries with high levels of fixed investment often
obtain higher than average profit rates. High levels of innovation in products or
processes enable technical or design rents to be reaped by industries and firms.
High profit rates permit workers to bargain for higher than average wages and
for relatively secure employment and good conditions of work. Conversely,
territorial industries or firms with low profitability tend to compensate by
depressing wages and conditions and imposing ‘numerical flexibility’
(variations in hours, times of work and number of jobs) on their workforces. Job
skill also affects employment conditions. Workers in low skill jobs where
management can directly dictate the form of tasks and the pace at which they
are performed are in a weak bargaining position. They can be replaced easily. A
cooperative attitude and commitment from the worker is of small importance;
the firm can therefore offer poor wages and conditions with impunity
(Friedman, 1977). Indeed, where workers are strongly organised employers
often seek to develop technologies that supplant human skills (Braverman,
1974; Noble, 1984).
These processes, then, systematically produce inequalities in jobs. The universal
discipline of labour by capital is intensified in particular sectors and sites. The
outcome is a large ‘secondary’ sector of poor jobs. These not only offer low and
insecure incomes, but belittle the workers, fail to develop their skills, and are
often unhealthy. The workers are denied even a limited degree of autonomy and
responsibility.

These problems are compounded in irregular forms of work such as selfemployment, the informal economy and crime. Low-skilled self-employment,
or where the required skills are widespread, is typically not only insecure but
also low paid. In the modern economy much ‘self-employment’ is de facto
employment by a firm, which thereby avoids regulatory obligations. The firm
can even make ‘self-employed’ workers responsible for their own costs for
working or pay a fee to the firm for the right to work for it. Self-employed status,
far from giving autonomy, is particularly strong subordination to capital. Other
large categories of ‘self-employment’, particularly for women and migrant
workers, are domestic service and home work (piecework performed at home).
Their spatial and social isolation, often compounded by immigration status,
subordinate the worker brutally to her employer.
High rates of unemployment or the availability of only poor jobs force people
to seek their income from the unregistered (or ‘informal’) economy. Informal
status is usually found in sectors with intense price and cost competition, where
many firms survive by avoidance of tax and regulation of wages, work
conditions and layoffs. Workers, like the self-employed, may choose an
informal job status to avoid tax, but thereby lose legal rights and future state
benefits. These jobs are particularly poor as both a cause and consequence of
their informal status.
Criminal work has always and everywhere been major survival strategy for the
poor. The two most important contemporary sectors are sex work (mostly
women), and the supply of criminalised drugs (mostly men). The criminalisation
of sex work ensures that the work is controlled by pimps and gangs, and that
international trafficking leads to de facto slavery. Drug dealing is organised by
partly non-capitalist rules: competition between gangs proceeds through
violence. But production and distribution are organised by pseudo-capitalist
firms. They are class-divided: to make a high income usually requires one to be
a crime boss; for the criminal proletariat incomes are low and unpredictable
(Davis, 1992: Ch.5). Thus the contemporary illegal-drugs industry “has
involved ‘deskilling’ and the growth of the ‘mass labour market’. The mass
labourers .... may be as disadvantaged in this as in any other form of
employment” (Croall, 1998: 266). The majority of burglars are young men with
few skills, who face high risks of detection and reap low rewards (op.cit.: 229).
Theft by women is mainly shoplifting, with even lower returns.
Thus the majority of self-employment, informal and criminal work may be
regarded as the extreme end of a continuum of poor jobs which begins in the
formal sector. Whilst breaking certain capitalist rules, these forms of work are
reproduced systematically by capitalism: workers are forced into them through
lack of decent formal jobs, and cost-cutting sectors are informalised to cut costs

further. These parts of the economy should not, then, be regarded as outside the
logic of capitalism.
Unemployment
Capitalism offers no guarantee or right to employment. Unemployment is not
an ‘imperfection’ of capitalism but is systemically produced and essential for
capital accumulation. Unemployment is created by four processes, each
intrinsic to capitalism:(i) Intensification of work (absolute surplus value) and investment in new
technologies of production (relative surplus value) constantly displace labour.
These are propelled by management’s wish to gain greater control over its
workforce, and by competitive pressure to increase productivity (Marx, 1970).
(ii) Particular territorial economies (national, regional, local) can become
uncompetitive as a result of insufficient investment in fixed capital, R&D and
training, because labour has become too strong, insufficient investment in social
and physical infrastructures, or due to inflation in land prices. Capital then shifts
to other territories and unemployment rises. This spatial uneven development
is, again, intrinsic to capitalism (Das, 2017).
(iii) The capitalist business cycle of 6 – 10 years results in regular recessions in
which workers are laid off and new workers cannot find jobs. In the upswing
of the cycle firms invest without coordination and wages tend to rise. This
eventually results in excess capacity, falling final prices and decreasing profits
or rising losses, resulting in cuts to investment, capacity and output;
unemployment rises and wages fall (Hahnel and Sherman, 1982; Gough, 2003:
Ch.12).
(iv) Capitalism generates long waves in which investment rate and increases in
output are strong for 20-30 years and periods of 20-50 years when they are weak.
Over the latter periods unemployment is much higher than the former. These
long waves, too, are generated by fundamental dynamics of capitalism (Mandel,
1978; Roberts, 2016).
These processes impact poverty. Unemployment enables employers to create
and recreate the poor jobs described above, by recruiting the unemployed and
threatening existing workers with replacement. High levels of unemployment
can enable employers to effect qualitative change in employment practices.
Moreover, the least skilled workers are most likely to suffer unemployment,
since employers, even for poor jobs, select workers with better skills and work
experience; a long period of unemployment thus worsens the chances of
obtaining a job.

Social differentiation of employment and unemployment
Jobs and unemployment are also affected by the oppressions of gender, ethnicity
and age. Social life produces different status, imputed need for a (good) job,
and different access to skills demanded in waged work. Employers providing
poor jobs may prefer women, certain racialised groups or young people as cheap
or malleable labour; these groups then may have relatively low rates of
unemployment but low rates of pay. But in some localities oppressed groups
have high rates of unemployment because of their low skill levels or lack of
continuity of employment, inability to access jobs because of care
commitments, discrimination by employers, or hostility from other workers. In
either case, poverty of these groups is reproduced. This then reinforces their
oppression within social life: poor jobs reproduce social oppressions and social
oppressions reproduce poor jobs. The competition between workers for jobs
which is a fundamental feature of capitalism then leads native-born workers to
resent immigrants for undercutting wages and ‘taking their jobs’. Thus the
ethnic/racial division of labour politically divides the poor more than it does
better-off workers (Gough, 2017).
This analysis suggests that class and social oppressions should not be regarded
as distinct sets of social relations which merely interact or ‘intersect’ with each
other externally, but rather are internally related processes which construct each
other (McNally, 2015).
Spatial differentiation
We have seen that investment and output are spatially uneven. Alongside such
quantitative differences, qualitative differences are systematically produced, so
that particular types of poor jobs are concentrated in particular areas. Industries
with high productivity and innovation tend to be spatially agglomerated into
particular ‘core’ localities and regions. Agglomeration enables the reproduction
of a workforce with the skills and attitudes desired by employers, and helps to
foster cooperative relations between firms and their employees. It facilitates
networking, collaboration and changing divisions of labour between firms for
flows of goods, services, information and personnel. These virtuous circles of
agglomeration tend to be strongest in the production of complex goods and
services which require strong knowledge generation and application and which
use relatively skilled labour (Storper and Walker, 1989). The high value-added
can then be partly appropriated by workers as good wages and conditions. In
contrast, in industries or stages of production which produce standardised goods
or services, where little new knowledge is generated, and where tasks are
relatively low skilled, production tends to be located in ‘peripheral’ low cost
locations. Many of these jobs have been split off from higher-level work in the
same firm or production chain precisely in order to separate them spatially and
socially (Massey, 1984). Since low costs can be found in many regions of the

developed countries and in most of the HICs, this production is footloose,
moving in search of yet lower wages, more pliant workers, or new state
subsidies.
Core and peripheral areas create poverty in distinct ways. In the peripheral areas
the majority of jobs are poor. Substantial levels of unemployment are chronic.
It is hard for unions to recruit. The informal and criminal economies usually
form a large proportion of economic activity. When this situation persists over
decades, expectations regarding wages, conditions, skill and career are low, and
people’s self-confidence as economic agents is minimal.
But the core areas also create poverty. Consumer service jobs, whether in the
private or public sector or in domestic service, are as poor in these areas as in
others: low skilled and ‘numerically flexible’, offering low wages and poor
conditions and security (Bryson et al, 2004). But land and housing, dominated
by core production activities and core workers, are expensive, so that those in
poor jobs are even worse off in core regions than in peripheral ones (Sassen,
1991). Low aggregate unemployment rate across a core region disguises high
rates of unemployment and underemployment for those with a poor work
history, for ethnic minorities, and for people living in stigmatised
neighbourhoods.
Immigrants naturally try to settle mainly in core regions. The work of these
migrant communities is typically in the consumer service sectors, in the
informal economy, or in businesses owned by people of their own ethnicity; in
the latter, bonds of ethnicity are used to subordinate workers and jobs are
typically very poor (Kakios and van der Velden, 1984). ‘Illegal’ immigrants
working in sweatshops, domestic service or sex work are subject to the very
worst conditions, violence, and often de facto slavery. Where members of
migrant communities are employed in large numbers by a local industry in order
to worsen wages and conditions, this creates resentment and xenophobia on the
part of people born in the area.
Whereas in weak regions poverty can be the majority culture, a widely shared
experience represented in dominant discourses, in core regions the sociallyoppressed and the poor appear as anomalous because they have somehow failed
to share in the ‘general’ prosperity; the cultures of the poor tend to be more
suppressed, and indeed seen as threatening, within the region’s dominant
discourses (Stedman Jones, 1983; Davis, 1992). Whereas in the weak regions
capital mobility undermines collective organisation, in the core regions
divisions within labour undermine collective organisation (Gough, 2003).
We see, then, that poor jobs and low incomes from work are constructed
systematically by patterns of capital accumulation and internally-related

capitalist wage relations. Since the late 19C these processes have been
increasingly strongly mediated by the state, to which we now turn.
3. Poverty and the state
In the view of the Right, the state is a major creator of poverty since it blocks
the ‘free markets’ which can price the poor into work. This view neglects the
enormous positive role of the state in capital accumulation and in the production
of labour power needed by capital. In the social democratic view, the state is an
institution which can intervene into the economy ‘from the outside’ in the
interests of ‘the public good’, thus potentially eliminating poverty. But this
greatly exaggerates the autonomy of the state from capitalist dynamics. In the
Marxist approach taken here, the state arises from the contradictions and failures
of capital accumulation and the reproduction of labour power, and is a site of
the conflict between capital and labour (Clarke, 1991). State policies can
therefore either benefit or hurt the poor, depending on class struggle and how
the reproduction of the poor articulates with capital accumulation. We examine
four areas of state intervention directly impacting poverty: policies for the
waged economy to benefit the poor, taxation, public services, and state benefits.3
State intervention into the waged economy
Since 1945, states have intervened strongly into the waged economy. Some
policies have ostensibly been directed at reducing poverty; they are, however,
always also aimed at strengthening capital accumulation, and their success is
conditional on achieving the latter. Five types of policy are important here.
First, states have used fiscal and monetary policy to counter the business cycle,
and thus lessen the rise of unemployment in recessions. When profit rates on
capital are moderate or high, these interventions can stimulate investment and
expansion of output. However, if long term profit rates are low, fiscal or
monetary stimulus instead results in inflation in the price of goods and services
(1960s – 1970s) or in financial assets (since the 1980s). This illustrates the
limited effectiveness of the state on the dynamics of capital (Clarke, 1988; de
Brunhof, 1978).
Second, the state has attempted to stimulate investment in regions, localities and
parts of cities with high unemployment. This has been done partly by
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. Policing of the poor has major impacts, mostly negative. These are not discussed here due
to lack of space; see Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006: 122-125, 203. Where policing has the
greatest negative impact on the poor is, however, the repression and sabotage of the trade
unions, social movements and struggles of the whole working class.

national government investing in physical infrastructures and giving subsidies
for capital investment. It has been done by regional or local states either
attempting to attract inward investment, or by stimulating investment by locallybased industries and firms (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993). Interregional
redistribution of investment has had some success in increasing manufacturing
investments in poor regions (Rhodes, 1995). But the great majority of this has
been low skill, standardised production, which was spontaneously locating to
these regions (Massey, 1979; Peet, 1987). Policy largely failed to increase
higher value-added production. Moreover, firms often move elsewhere after
five or ten years when re-equipment is needed. Some regional and local
initiatives have attempted to root production more strongly in the area by
organising relations between firms and institutions and linking investment to
training and reproduction of labour power (Gough and Eisenschitz, 1996;
Gough, 2002). But this strategy has often been too weak to change the cost
cutting and labour-disciplinary strategies of firms, or to counter national and
global flows of commodities, information and capital (Eisenschitz and Gough,
1996). Regional and local economic strategy has thus generally failed radically
to improve the quantity and quality of jobs in poor areas.
Third, during depressions governments may consider the classic Keynesian
policy of directly creating jobs wholly funded by state spending, through
physical infrastructure building or social service provision; the classic case was
the US New Deal in the 1930s. But this approach has been little used, and the
New Deal itself was very limited in scale. In a depression capital is particularly
resistant to increased state spending. Moreover, this type of state intervention
is dangerously politicising, in showing the socialist potential of state-funded
jobs for all the unemployed; this danger underlay the refusal of Roosevelt to
carry out the New Deal in cities, confining it to rural areas where organised
labour was weaker.
Four, training funded and organised by the state has sometimes been targeted on
disadvantaged workers, including the long term unemployed, those with
redundant skills, poor education or work experience, and women and BME
people, ostensibly to improve their position in the labour market. This usually
involves training in basic numeracy, literacy and work habits, plus low level
manual or clerical skills. In localities with low unemployment these
programmes can have positive effects. But where unemployment is substantial,
training does not lead to a job. Rather, by increasing the supply of low-skilled
labour power, the schemes tend to exacerbate competition between workers and
enable employers to further reduce wages (Martin, Nativel and Sunley, 2003).
To be successful such schemes would need to be tied to effective local job
creation. As so often, a ‘common sense’ policy targeting a particular problem
on its own terrain fails, or is actually counter-productive, because it is not joined
up with other policies (Gough, 2002).

Fifth, the state may attempt to improve wages and health and safety of poor jobs
by regulation of employers to meet minimum standards. However, in countries
with liberal traditions, resources for policing these standards are usually wholly
inadequate and penalties for violations derisory. Moreover, if a firm is closed
down by regulators, it often starts up under another name. Effective regulation
usually requires strong industry or community-based trade unions.
Six, since the 1970s states have sponsored entrepreneurship for the poor,
whereby the poor ‘create their own jobs.’ This has been a favourite policy in
many HICs since the 1970s. Conventional firms and not-for-profit enterprises
have been subsidised in various ways, with management training subsidized for
the unemployed, women and black, Asian and minority ethnic populations
(BME) (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993: 88-99). But despite the subsidies, these
enterprises are drastically under-capitalised and lack innovative or distinctive
products. They are generally in sectors with low barriers to entry, where startups simply add to over-production, exacerbate intense price competition, and
thus put further downward pressure on prices and wages and leads to more
failures (ibid.: 172-9). This is true of social enterprises as well as private firms
(Eisenschitz and Gough, 2011). The new private firms tend to have very low
wages and poor conditions; BME-owned enterprises employing workers of the
same ethnicity typically use community ties to super-exploit (Kakios and van
der Velden, 1984). Overall, state encouragement of entrepeneurship of the poor
thus results in many losing their meagre savings, and in further downward
pressure on wages and conditions in small-firm, low capitalisation sectors.
We see, then, that state economic interventions in the interests of the poor often
fail because they cut across patterns of capital accumulation, are too weak, or
are insufficiently coordinated with other policies. But for the state to be bolder
and more holistic would risk politicisation and encourage demands which
challenge capital (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1996).
Taxation of the poor
The enormous growth of state spending in the last 100 years has required a
corresponding increase in taxation. The majority of tax revenue comes from the
population rather than business. Workers pay tax in four main forms: income
tax, purchase taxes, social insurance contributions, and local taxes on house
value. Income tax is progressive (a higher rate the higher the income) from low
incomes to the upper middle class, but middle income earners often have tax
breaks, and the rich pay little income tax by using international tax evasion.
Purchase taxes are broadly neutral. Taxes on housing value are regressive. The
result is that the poor can pay tax at a rate similar to, or even more than, the
average. This problem has been exacerbated by neoliberalism: taxes on
corporations have been cut; purchase taxes have increased relative to income
tax; income tax has become less progressive, and evasion of it by the rich easier.

Taxation is thus a very substantial contributor to poverty. Accordingly, middle
and low earners often fiercely resist increases in taxation (British poll tax
uprising in 1989, French gilets jaunes in 2019).
Social services
From the late 19C until the 1980s there was qualitative and quantitative growth
of universal public services funded by the state or by compulsory social
insurance; particularly relevant to the poor are education, nurseries, health care,
and social services. These forms of care were provided inadequately or not all
at to working class households, which lacked the time and skills to provide
them internally and the money to buy them externally. Their hundred-year
growth was powered both by working class demands, and by the wish of some
sections of capital for a more skilled and healthy workforce (I.Gough, 1982).
Women, particularly, benefited from these services as they socialised some
aspects of care work regarded as women’s responsibility (Wilson, 1977).
These services have undoubtedly benefited the poor, and to some extent
compensated for low household incomes. But the promise of universal services
that they would give equal benefit to all, irrespective of income, has not been
met. First, public services often have inadequate funding. Even in times of
prosperity there is resistance to increases in taxation from parts of business and
the population. Social provision transgresses the capitalist belief that the
individual is responsible for their own reproduction. Public services are labourintensive and increases in productivity are hard to make without sacrificing
quality, so that their cost tends to increase as a proportion of GDP. Where public
services are funded substantially from local taxation (something which varies
enormously between countries), poorer localities are forced to have lower
spending.
Second, public services have tended to prioritise their function for business, to
reproduce useful labour power. Thus services for the elderly, the disabled and
the mentally ill tend to be poorly funded. The quality of care varies enormously
as a function of the political pressure from the working class; where this is weak,
the services can be drastically underfunded, disciplinary, cruel, and sometimes
lethal. School education has been strongly influenced by the aim of feeding
young people into the labour market. The education of future professional
workers (mainly middle class children) has been separated from that of manual
and clerical workers (working class children) in different schools or streams. A
large part of the real curriculum has been to teach children to be quiet, sit still,
postpone gratification, and accept the teacher’s authority (Bowles and Gintis,
1976; Illich, 1983). This obedience is a crucial quality required by all employers
(Braverman, 1974), and this is the only quality required in poor, routine jobs .

Third, the working class, and the poor particularly, tend to get less out of given
public services than middle class people. Service delivery often favours the
‘respectable’ working class over the poor, men over women, white people over
black. The poor, lacking daily experience of performing with middle class
people, tend to negotiate less well with teachers, doctors, housing managers and
social workers. The poor often need more from the service – more intensive
teaching due to lack of cultural knowledge, more health care due to poorer
health, more help from social workers due to material deprivation and
consequent family tensions (Tudor Hart, 1971; Carrier and Kendall, 1998). Poor
children often have low attention spans at school due to hunger or to a highly
processed diet, and have no quiet space at home to do homework (Millar, 2004).
Many poor children reject the class-disciplinary aspect of education, as they
often do not see the kind of knowledge imparted by schools as relevant to their
situation. School therefore becomes a game of wills, in which misbehaviour
provides the only sense of power and enjoyment (Willis, 1977).
The failures of public services for the poor are, then, embedded in, and
subordinate to, society-wide structures of exploitation and oppression: the
services to a large extent serve and reproduce individuals’ places within the
dominant social relations, and individuals bring to the services their past
conditioning by those relations.
State benefits
The wages of the poor often do not allow the most basic social reproduction
(section 2). In consequence, over the last century the state has been drawn
increasingly into providing incomes and money-benefits (I.Gough, 1982).
Sections of business sometimes support unemployment benefits in order to
reproduce a workforce of sufficient quality and in the right place. In contrast,
state incomes for those who can never work and the retired have been largely
the result of pressure from the working class.
State-funded transfer incomes are, however, severely constrained by capitalist
social relations. Because of the extent of the failure of wage incomes, their
aggregate cost to the state is enormous: in Britain in 2005, for example, it was
11% of GDP and a third of all state spending (Millar, 2003). Moreover, state
incomes for people of working age must be low enough not to deter them from
seeking the lowest wage employment, while being high enough to avoid
destitution; this results in the ‘poverty trap’ (from the point of view of workers)
and disincentives to work (from the point of view of employers). These
contradictions underlie three alternative forms for delivering benefits:(i) Social insurance and contributory benefits

These incomes for sickness, unemployment and retirement are funded by
contributions from waged workers, and sometimes also from employers and the
state. The form fits capitalist norms in that individuals fund their own benefits,
and benefits may increase with contributions. A disadvantage for workers is that
the benefits are limited to those with a (sufficient) work record, excluding many.
Moreover, because they are not tied to needs, benefits may not meet the costs of
subsistence for a particular household and place.
(ii) Non-contributory benefits
These contradictions of social insurance have led to the development of noncontributory benefits. These purport to address unmet need, and are selective
with respect to social group, existing income and savings, household form, and
living costs. Members of specific groups such as children or the retired may get
a ‘categorical benefit’ irrespective of their household income; but benefits to
(potential) workers and their households are means tested. Non-contributory
benefits can also pay towards the cost of items regarded as essential such as
housing, school meals, heating of pensions’ homes, basic durables, and local
taxes, thus taking account of variable living costs.
The variable and targeted nature of such benefits and their lack of relation to the
labour market cause problems for both state and recipient. First, these benefits
are more likely than social insurance to lead to the ‘poverty trap’ since they are
designed to meet basic subsistence but no more, cutting off if a slightly higher
wage income is obtained. This then produces pressure to extend the benefits to
those on higher incomes. Second, whereas social insurance provides benefits to
individuals, mean-tested benefits are tailored to households, tending to reinforce
the financial dependence of women on men (McKay and van Every, 2000).
Third, the state has to employ investigators to check the income, expenditures
and household composition of claimants. This policing conflicts with the
fundamental capitalist ideology of the privacy of the home. Fourth, many fail to
apply for means-tested benefits, because of resentment of the invasion of
privacy, ignorance of their rights, the complicated and slow administration
involved (Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992: 72). Fifth, landlords of benefit
claimants tend to raise their rents knowing that they will still be paid. Six, unlike
contributory benefits, the state may make receiving non-contributory benefits
conditional on ‘searching for work’, that is, taking any job however unsuitable,
low paid or remote (‘workfare’). This is not only bad for the individual, but in
aggregate fuels the expansion of poor jobs (Jones and Novak, 1999).
(iii) Tax credits
One way in which states have attempted to deal with the contradictions of
benefits is to reduce income tax on low wage-income. The possibility and the
need for this policy arise from the substantial income tax paid on low wages

(see Taxation above). The effective benefit paid is still means tested, but the
poverty trap is reduced since tax reduction continues to apply as claimants take
up waged employment. Tax credits avoid one of the problems of noncontributory benefits by appearing as retained earnings rather than ‘a handout’.
However, if tax credits are to reflect household composition or costs,
administration is still intrusive. Moreover, tax credits for low-waged workers,
in the long term and in aggregate, enable employers in low-age sectors to reduce
wages. The state expenditure then flows as subsidy to employers, with little net
benefit to the employees, just as housing benefits end up as subsidies to
landlords with little benefit to tenants.
There are, then, important material and ideological differences between these
three forms of state benefit. But none of them escapes from the tension between
the capitalist wage relation and the meeting of need by the state. The problems
of state benefit are not simply technical or administrative, as they are portrayed
in most the social policy literature, but are expressions of contradictions of the
wage relation.
In these ways, the state fails to overcome poverty (economic policy, public
services), or actually intensifies poverty (taxation, benefits).
4. Social reproduction and poverty
The self-reproduction of people within households and neighbourhoods is
closely entwined with poverty. Social life is a bulwark against poverty, but it
also involves many particular material deprivations, and tends to deepen wage
inequality. I consider here some interconnected threads: households and gender
difference, neighbourhood survival strategies, housing, neighbourhood poverty,
and consumption of commodities. All of these are deeply connected to the
economic and state relations discussed in previous sections.
Household, caring work and gender
In capitalism, the core site of the reproduction of people is the household, which
uses wage and state-benefit income to purchase goods and services, including
housing, and use them to carry out domestic and caring work, the majority of
which is carried out by women. Poor housing and inadequate durables and nondurables mean the poor have to perform more domestic work than the betteroff. This is compounded by lack of income to buy services: nurseries and child
minders, care homes for elderly relatives, repairs to the house and durables,
ready-cooked meals. The results are a massive burden of domestic work falling
mainly on women, the ‘triple working day’ (Little et al., 1988) and also a
tendency for the poor to be inadequately cared for materially and sometimes
emotionally.

Since the earliest industrial capitalism, the burden of domestic work has been
particularly onerous because both women and men in poor heterosexualfamilies have had, or sought, waged employment. From the late nineteenth
century better-paid working class men demanded, and sometimes obtained, a
‘family wage’ so that their wives could be full-time carers. Since the 1960s,
however, women with male partners have increasingly taken up waged
employment. Women have sought the financial and social independence of a
job. A new norm of a dual wage household has also enabled capital to hold wage
rises below increases in productivity while still meeting household consumption
norms. In consequence, the two-wage couple has become the norm, as it has
always been for the poor. This development has the potential for greater gender
equality; but the reality has largely been for women to continue to do the lion’s
share of domestic work, so that the net result is an intensification of their
working day. Moreover, the new social norm of two wages means that working
class couples with one or no wage are much poorer relative to the average
household than trends in individual wage distribution suggest (Leira, 2002).
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, extended poor families living
within a neighbourhood enabled much caring work to be shared between
generations of women (Young and Willmott, 1957). But since the Second World
War the family has tended to shrink to parents and their biological children. This
shift has been underpinned by rising real wages, lightening of some domestic
tasks, the state pension, smaller numbers of children, and by more frequent
moves to obtain jobs. The result, however, is that working class carers are now
more isolated, and thus have greater difficulty in taking up waged employment.
The
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This tendency has been exacerbated by decline of support from non-kin
neighbours. The poor have traditionally survived through the material and moral
support of their neighbourhood. Neighbours supplied help with domestic work,
and constituted mini-welfare systems that helped to solve problems in family
relations, finance and housing. Childcare and repairs were available on a
reciprocal basis (Pahl and Wallace, 1985). Children could play safely in the
streets because of being watched over by neighbours (and the absence of cars).
What this lacked was privacy or room for unconventional social behaviour
(Hoggart, 1957). Kin and neighbourhood also provided access to jobs. Better
jobs, especially, required someone to ‘speak for’ you (McKibbin, 1998: 120).
Moreover, communities facilitated ‘ducking and diving’ - the entrepreneurship
of the poor (Ross, 1983; Tebbutt, 1983). Cheap illegally acquired goods were
available. These means of survival were legitimated by the local culture, which
consequently tended to be hostile to policing of the neighbourhood.
But this system has been eroded. During the 20C networks in poor

neighbourhoods were weakened by the increase in women’s time spent in wage
work, increasing commoditisation of consumption, growing state services, and
suburbanisation. All of these were associated with increases in living standards
for the majority, and, to some extent, for the poor. Yet their paradoxical effect
has been to weaken the social structures through which the poor survived, and
to reduce their control over their lives and ability to recover from setbacks.
Greater dependence on commodities has eroded practical skills for work and
creativity in the home. Expanding public services have individualised their users
rather than developed community cooperation. Slum clearance dispersed
longstanding communities by failing to re-house them in situ. Indeed, this was
often an aim of planners who sought to break up what they saw as a negative
‘culture of poverty’ (Burns, 1963; Davies, 1972). Social housing opportunities
for young adults often located them far from their neighbourhood support
networks (Speak and Graham, 2000).
These changes have had the effect of isolating poor individuals and households
(Li et al, 2003). Help with caring work, moral support in crises and job
networking have been weakened. Many consequently suffer from isolation,
sometimes reinforced by depression and low self-esteem. Moreover, weakening
of neighbourly ties has made it more difficult to deal with bad neighbours by
reducing the collective pressure and actions that kept noise, rubbish dumping,
public violence and vandalism in limits, so that these have become major
problems of many poor areas.
This is not to argue that mutuality and community solidarity have disappeared
among the poor. Indeed, community networks may be strongest in the poorest
working class neighbourhoods (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). The strength of
community ties varies strongly between neighbourhoods, depending partly on
the degree of population stability (Cattell and Evans, 1999; Johnston et al.,
2000). The diagnosis of complete social fragmentation is an ideological one: it
deflects attention from external conditions creating poverty and legitimates the
capacity building approach to poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, social-spatial
modernisation has eroded many of the traditional survival mechanisms.
Housing
Since the dawn of industrial capitalism, housing of the poor has been
overcrowded, cold and unhealthy; this continues to the present day. There are
large differences between HICs in their mixes of housing tenures, historically
produced by class struggles and forms of urbanisation. But certain features of
capitalist housing are universal. First, houses are expensive to build relative to
working class incomes, and a fortiori incomes of the poor. The cost of new
build, or purchase of existing houses, is met by borrowing (by whatever agent)
from banks or savings/loan institutions; repayments or rent on this debt are large
relative to working class incomes, particularly if interest rates are high.

Moreover, the production of housing and its repair is labour intensive and hard
to mechanise. The production cost of housing therefore tends to rise in the longerm relative to the costs of manufactures and some services; that is, it rises in
real terms.
Second, in capitalism land is a commodity. Since it is not produced, its price
depends on the ground rent, the locationally-specific portion of profit realisable
on the site (commercial land), or on the house price premium payable for the
location of the site (housing land) (Edel, 1976); to the extent that commercial
and housing uses respectively can be exchanged, these prices tend to converge.
The price for a house site in cities and towns can therefore be high, sometimes
many times the production cost of the house itself. Land price is thus a tribute
paid by the poor to landowners. The housing land price is highest in the cities
where jobs are plentiful and well-paid, and lowest in cities and rural areas where
unemployment is high and wage low. Workers thus face a geographical trade
off between job availability and housing price. In particular, the poor in poor
areas usually cannot afford to move to growth locations to work. At a smaller
scale, land in distant suburbs can be cheap, particularly in countries with lowdensity cities (North America, Australia); but this has the severe penalty of total
dependence on the car.
These problems are mediated by tenure (CSE, 1976). The poor generally cannot
get mortgages because they lack secure long-term income. Where the poor do
obtain a mortgage, they become vulnerable to any rise in interest rates and then
face losing everything, as with ‘sub-prime’ mortgages in the US in 2007. In
many countries the poor in cities have no option but to rent from private
landlords. The latter have an effective class monopoly, and can charge high
rents for cramped accommodation in poor repair, with no security of occupation
(Harvey 1973). This causes continual disruption to the lives of poor households,
including children’s schooling. The only way that rents become affordable,
tenancies become secure, and repairs get done is through strong state regulation,
which always requires working class struggle. By far the best housing for the
poor is state-owned or cooperative. These, too, require state regulation and loan
guarantees. Expansion of social housing is sometimes supported by sections of
capital which see low-rent housing as a way to moderate wages, but its
expansion always relies on working class pressure.
Poor neighbourhoods
Since the 18C, capitalist towns and cities separate different income groups by
area. People who have the money seek to live in the ‘best’ neighbourhood they
can afford in terms of house quality, amenities and physical environment, and
for social-cultural reasons seek neighbours of the same (or higher) income.
House and land price in these neighbourhoods rise. These prices then exclude
people of lower income. The outcome over time is that the whole city acquires

a structure of single-income neighbourhoods, and thus neighbourhoods which
have only poor residents.
In British and US cities the pattern has been of outward movement of the betteroff to newly-built suburbs: the middle class from the early nineteenth century,
the better-off working class from the late 19C through to the 1950s. Social
democratic reformers saw the leafy suburb as a solution not just to the housing
problems of the poor but to poverty in all its forms (Howard, 1902). But the
poor could not afford housing costs of the suburbs nor the costs and time of
commuting, and thus largely remained in their old areas. In consequence, by the
1960s inner city areas were largely poor. In Britain, as elsewhere in Western
Europe, public housing has been built either in old working class areas or on
peripheral green field sites. The majority of public housing has thus been in
lower income neighbourhoods, mirroring market patterning (Wadhams, 2002).
Spatial concentration of the poor is deepened for BME groups by racism. Due
to low income and racist exclusion from many suburbs, BMEs locate in existing
areas of poor, cheap housing. This pattern then develops cumulatively, due to
the wish of ethnic minorities to live with others of the same ethnicity to obtain
jobs and for social support and shared cultural facilities, as well as to minimise
racist attacks.
Spatial segregation by income has led to vicious circles of privilege at one pole
and deprivation at the other. Higher-income neighbourhoods tend to have better
private services, better exam grades in schools, more open space, and fresher
air, which strongly shape life chances and class position. The housing market
enables the better off to capture these ‘public goods’ and capitalise them. The
logical counterpart to these processes is the worsening of conditions of the poor
through their ghettoisation. Public services, retailing, financial services and
transport are often of poor quality. Industrial and vehicle air pollution are often
high. The area then becomes stigmatised. Residents are stereotyped by
employers as illiterate and innumerate, unreliable or dishonest (Mee, 1994).
Mortgage providers often ‘red line’ these areas, which leads to cumulative
under-investment in housing (Harvey, 1973).
These problems then cause households that can move out to do so, draining the
neighbourhood of economic and political resources (Byrne, 1999; Power, 2000).
This has led some poor neighbourhoods in low-growth cities to become
seriously depopulated; streets become emptied and rapidly vandalised; the
physical environment becomes atrocious (Harvey, 2000).
Spatial changes in capitalist investment in employment and consumer services
across cities have further disadvantaged the poor. As cars have become the
norm, retail has become increasingly concentrated in giant malls, and
neighbourhood shops close. Health services have tended to concentrate. New

office, warehouse and (remaining) factory investment is located in large sites on
city peripheries or further out. For poor people without cars - or without the use
of the household car as is often the case for women and young people - these
services and jobs become inaccessible or require very long (and expensive)
journeys by bus.
We should, however, note that spatial concentration of the poor is a potential
resource for political mobilisation. Collective action tends to be easiest to
organise on the basis of shared problems. Local organisation is easier in terms
of time and money. Social networks provide a starting point for organising.
Moreover, collective organisation depends on trust of its leaders; in a
neighbourhood the latter are known personally, and subject to collective will
(Beitel, 2017). However, neighbourhood mobilisation of the poor is limited by
the heavy, often racist, policing of poor neighbourhoods.
A different type of problem for poor neighbourhoods is their eviction in favor
of users who are able to pay a higher ground rent. In cities at the top of the
business-service hierarchy, professional employment has increased steadily
since the 1960s. Some of these professionals wish to live in inner city locations,
because of the easy access to the CBD, the historic architecture, or, iteratively,
the ‘vibrant’ social atmosphere. Up until the 1980s this was largely achieved by
the individual professional household buying single houses from owner
occupiers or landlords; the former could then move out to the suburbs. Since the
1980s, however, gentrification has been accelerated, and carried out in more
‘difficult’ neighbourhoods, by local governments in association with large
property companies; the existing residents are evicted together, the housing
demolished, and rebuilt, often at higher density, for middle class use. The
evicted residents may be offered small compensation, or offered cheap low
quality housing in remote locations (Lees et al, 2008). In both ‘classical’ and
state-led gentrification, the working class lose their social and kin networks, and
access to their jobs in the inner and central city. Less well-recognised are the
problems for the rural poor created by the move of middle class commuters and
retirees into pretty villages and the purchase of second homes there. This has
severely depleted the housing stock available to working class people and forced
young people to leave their communities (Cloke et al, 2002). Once again, the
life-world of the poor is disrupted by capitalist land and housing markets.
Damaged by commodities
Long-term growth in the productivity of consumer commodity sectors tends to
increase the volume and types of commodities (goods and services) which
constitute normal consumption. While some of these commodities can be useful
for the poor, they can also damage them. First, many common commodities do
physical or psychological harm. Unhealthy foods and fast food, dangerous
chemicals used in thousands of household products, the video games and social

media which decrease children’s attention span – these are part of the
consumption of the whole society. But they are a particular problem for the
poor, since they have the least choice in what they buy and are most deprived of
information on these products. The capitalist production of information and
entertainment means that the poor consume newspapers, TV, music and games
which often convey reactionary assumptions on gender, ‘race’ and class, and
thus contribute to their low self-esteem and disempowerment.
Second, new products become necessities: the car (by its reconfiguration of the
urban fabric), the internet (to be in touch with the contemporary world), the
mobile phone (for young people to have a social life), and so on. Culturallyloaded commodities (clothes, music, leisure spaces) become important for the
formation of personal identities. These commodities are then not freely chosen
but are coercive. But the poor often cannot afford these commodities, or have
to sacrifice essentials in order to buy them. This leads to the poor being
excluded from mainstream social and cultural life.
Third, the poor sometimes consume luxuries, again at the expense of essentials.
They may buy expensive versions of simple commodities. Poor youth aspire to
luxury brands of clothing, luggage, jewellery, drinks and perfume. Expensive
school proms and lavish nights out on the town are popular, as are stag and hen
weekends in distant cities. Luxuries have long been promoted by advertising,
life-style magazines and TV, and now by the social media. But the main push
is from people’s own lives: luxuries offer compensation for disempowering jobs
and conflictual social life, and enable a brief moment out of poverty.
Taking all these aspects of social life together, we can see that households and
neighbourhoods enable the poor to survive and to make life in some ways
tolerable. But the atomised and antagonistic relations of social life and its
material deprivation mean that the poor are not able adequately to reproduce
themselves nor their labour power. Moreover, by further weakening their
position in the labour market, their social life worsens their income deprivation.
5. Conclusion
We can conclude from this analysis that poverty in the HICs is not due to
‘market imperfections’ nor to internal features of poor neighbourhoods which
can be remedied by limited reforms targeted on the poor themselves. Rather, it
is systematically produced by the basic structures and processes of these
societies. The sphere of capitalist waged employment systematically produces
poor jobs and unemployment. Reciprocally, the poor play an important role in
capital accumulation. State economic and industrial policies fail substantially
to improve employment for the poor because constrained by lack of control over
capital and reluctance to politicise the economy; some policies actually worsen
poverty. Public services provide inferior outcomes for the poor. State transfer

incomes are inadequate because of their subordination to the capitalist wage
relation. Households and social life and the relations of kin and neighbourhood
are a vital support to the poor. But the effects of low and uncertain income are
exacerbated by materially-deprived caring and domestic work, inadequate
public and private services, and cramped and unhealthy housing. Moreover,
these undermine the poor’s reproduction of their own labour power and thus
deepen the employment causes of poverty. Gender and racism intertwine with
class to reinforce poverty as well as to differentiate it. Poverty is thus created
and perpetuated by the internally-related economy, state and social life of
capitalism.
This theorisation shows the vacuity of conceiving the poor as an ‘underclass’.
This views the poor as radically different from the rest of the population in their
capacities, attitudes and habits. But to the extent that the poor differ from the
non-poor, this is a way of coping with poverty, not its cause. The ‘underclass’
is typically portrayed as completely outside the normal waged economy. This
is true of some individuals and households for certain periods, but it is not
generally true: many are employed in poor jobs; and the breaks in that
employment are an intrinsic feature of those jobs, not of the workers who fill
them (Gans, 1990). Moreover, as we have seen, at a deep level the lives of all
the poor are dominated by the wage relation, capitalist accumulation, and their
mediation by the state; they are in no sense outside these relations. 4
In social-democratic thought, which dominates academic writing on poverty, --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. The analytical Marxist E.O.Wright incorporated an ‘underclass’ into his theorisation of class
structure (1995). He sees this underclass as wholly outside the wage relation, though
‘economically oppressed’. For a critique see Novak (1996).

the suffering of the poor is presented as distinct, as qualitatively different, from
the condition of the rest of the population. It is certainly materially and
psychologically worse. But all forms of exploitation, oppression, exclusion and
suffering of the poor are found also in the lives of the whole working population,
that is, in the 90%, the working class in the Marxist sense. The poor experience
a condensation of these oppressions, often in extreme forms, which moreover
compound each other. But the qualitative forms of these oppressions operate
across the whole population.
This internal relation between the poor and the not-poor also operates in the
reverse direction: the existence of the poor weighs down the lives of the whole
working class (Novak, 1995: 70-71; Jones and Novak, 1999: 18-24). Poor jobs
put chronic downward pressure on the wages and conditions of all workers. The
particular difficulties for workers in poor jobs to organise weaken the trade
unions. The unemployed and those in poor jobs are a reserve army which
employers in some sectors can use to undermine their employees’ wages and
conditions. Perhaps most importantly, workers in the non-poor economy accept
the discipline of their employers, and remain in tyrannous jobs, through fear of
losing their job and falling into the condition of the poor. Ideologically, the
constant campaign of denigration by the media and politicians against the poor
portrays the whole working class (in the conventional sense) as lazy, feckless
and stupid, thus justifying their exploitation and the forms of discipline directed
against all working class people (O.Jones, 2011).
If poverty is produced by the totality of society, then measures which target
particular sites or aspects of poverty are doomed to failure: it cannot be solved
outside of an end to capitalism. Since poverty is a condensation of oppressions
which are experienced by the whole population, it can only be addressed by
struggles against all forms of economic exploitation and social oppression,
including within, through and against the state. These struggles benefit the
whole population, not just the poor. The collective organisations of the whole
working class in both the production and reproduction spheres and within the
state are thus crucial for addressing both the immediate needs and long- term
interests of the poor.
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